The trouble with terrorism is that most people think they know what it is, but few can adequately define it. In his attempt at defining terrorism, Laqueur (1999, p.
14) described it as an analytical as well as a political challenge. From an analytical
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perspective, Laqueur believes that generalizations with regard to terrorism ‘are almost always misleading’. This has led to the academic study of terrorism being described as ‘descriptively rich but analytically barren’ (Ross, 1993). However, Roberts (2008) avers that the word ‘terrorism’ like many abstract political terms is confusing, dangerous, and indispensable. It is confusing because it means very different things to different people, and its meaning has also changed greatly, over time. It is dangerous because it easily becomes an instrument of propaganda and a means of avoiding thinking about the many forms and causes of political violence, and indispensable; because there is a real phenomenon out there that poses a serious threat. The confusion surrounding the issue stems from a number of sources. The distinctive methods that many scholars associate with terrorism involve the willful taking of human life and the infliction of severe mental distress, sometimes entailing, whether randomized or calculated, attacks on the innocent. Naturally, this raises fundamental ethical issues, provoking questions relating to concepts such as
‘just war’ and ‘non-combatant immunity’ (Harmon, 2000, p. 5).
Furthermore, because terrorism is not considered to be value-neutral, the word itself becomes an object for contention among conflicting parties involved in a conflict. Political conflicts are struggles for power and influence, and part of that struggle is about who labels whom. Since power tends to be largely concentrated in the hands of states, it has been argued that it is normally they who are able to attach the meaning to certain forms of political behaviour, which is why state terror is often ignored in studies of terrorism. Consequent upon this conceptual mess is that – in trying to deconstruct terrorism for academic analysis – the word has been all but defined out of existence.
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Attempts to define terrorism in recent years, especially since 2001, have reflected the fact that much contemporary terrorism is targeted against civilians.
According to Coleman (2015), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 of 8 October 2004 comes close to a definition of terrorism when it refers to it as:
“Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitutes offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.” Similarly, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which issued its report in December 2004, focused on civilians in its suggested definition of terrorism. The Panel defines it as: “Any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. While these UN definitions may contain a basis for a formal international legal definition of terrorism, a limitation of both (and especially of the second) should be noted. The UN has stressed its emphasis quite largely on the threat to civilians or non-combatants. It seems to suggest that certain acts such as attacks on armed peacekeeping forces, attacks on police or armed forces, or assassination of heads of state or government, are not included. Perhaps, they might not include the attacks on
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the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, so long as they do not involve the hijacking of a civilian airliner.
However, there are traps in these or any other definition of terrorism, and how the term is used. As argued by Roberts (2008), the most serious is that the label
‘terrorist’ has sometimes been applied to the activities of movements which, even if they did resort to violence, had serious claims to political legitimacy and also exercised care and restraint in their choice of methods. The recent Red Shirt pro-democracy agitators in Thailand, branded as ‘terrorists’ by the Thai authorities, is a case in point (CNN and Aljazeera News broadcasts, May 2010). It should be recalled that in 1987 and 1988, the UK and US governments labeled the African National Congress of South Africa as ‘terrorist’, a typical example of a shallow attribution even at the time, let alone in light of Nelson Mandela’s later emergence as Statesman. It is worthy of note therefore that indigenous terrorists in Nigeria since the 1980s have demonstrated some, if not all, of the traces identified with global terrorism.
Finally, no meaningful conclusion has been reached using these approaches.
This study does not claim to have a magic wand in resolving the definitional problem, which has haunted (as well as hindered) research on the subject for many decades. Nevertheless, it contends that – strictly for the purpose of this analysis – it is possible to describe terrorism as the deliberate creation of a sense of fear, usually by the use or threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence, to influence the political (and, in the case of Nigeria, social) behaviour of a given target group.
20 2.3 Reasons for Terrorism
Terrorists have different purposes for their operations, as their purpose is not just to kill as many people as possible, but rather to have the masses under the influence of terrorist activities (Kislali, 1999). The target of terror, which spoils reason and thinking processes and confuses masses, is to generate an atmosphere of distrust and uncertainty. While the atmosphere of distrust stemming from terror enhances the anxiety of people regarding the future, uncertainty raises feelings of no control.
Also, one other aim of terrorists is to create a sense of “we” and “they” partition promoted by the radical circles (Kökdemir, 2003). The major aim of terrorists is to ruin the morale of the people and security forces and create panic by intimidating the people and the targeted society. The targeted areas of Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria includes places of worship (mosques and churches), schools, shopping centres, restaurants, cafeterias, markets and any other form of gathering space in which multitudes of people meet and are targeted. The other aim of terror is to shake the authority of state by degrading the public institutions, security forces and other public officers in the eyes of public opinion (Varol, 2007). Terror mainly seeks to inflict psychological harm in society with minimum use of power (Sandler and Enders, 2004: 28). Terror is not there merely to kill and ruin, but rather to demonstrate its superiority by intimidating society through its activities. Terrorist organizations attempt to compel the government and realize their aspirations by instilling fear in public through violence and tension (Eme & Ibietan, 2012).
The goal of terrorist organizations can be classified under three (3) broad tactical goals according to Tavares (2004);
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i. Drawing attention: Terrorists would draw the attention of the public, thereby targeting prominent figures and strategic places such as cities, residential areas, schools, places of worship (churches and mosques) etc.
ii. Causing political instability: Terrorists perform their operations in order to cause political unrest, thereby resulting in the removal of the government in power.
Just like how the ruling party was voted out of office in the just concluded 2015 general elections in Nigeria, because they could not tackle the security challenges in the country.
iii. Imposing damage on economy: Terrorists also destroy the economy of a country because foreign investors will be discouraged from investing into that particular country.
2.4The Rise of Boko Haram Terrorists
Boko Haram, like many other terrorist organisations, is a product of globalization. It is a global phenomenon that borrows from many backgrounds and climes. The idea of militant Islamism has ideological roots in the Middle East but was nurtured, most ironically, in the mosques of London by preachers from the Middle East who moved to the United Kingdom in the 1980s and the 1990s. It is in UK that many would-be terrorists, hot-headed young men, imbibed the ideology whose complete circle ends with full indoctrination in Yemen and elsewhere. There is no pointer to the global nature of what is presently the world’s highest security risk than this. The growth of Nigeria’s Boko Haram followed almost a similar pattern (Ribadu, 2015).
The present anti-modernity version of extremism the country is witnessing in the Northern part of Nigeria started when just two Nigerians; Mohammed Ali from
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Borno State and Abu Umar from Kano, met a Syrian preacher, Abu Albasir al Dardusi in Yemen. It was this preacher who indoctrinated them in the line of rejecting western education and all the symbols of modern governance, based on a corrupt interpretation of a single hadith (sayings of the Prophet). Al Dardusi was one of the preachers who settled in the UK (Ribadu, 2015).
When the duo of Ali and Umar returned to Nigeria, they started converting people, especially young Sunni preachers who already had an extreme interpretation of Islam. Two smart and intelligent local preachers who are Bello Doma and Mohammed Yusuf were among their early converts. By his charisma, education and followership strength, Yusuf quickly got frontline prominence within the circle and, subsequently, emerged as the leader of the group. From 2001 onward, the group passed evolutional stages in nomenclature, structure and base. Disagreements on methodologies and other egoistic reasons also led to the formation of factions within the larger group which, however, reunited at a later time when Ali was killed and Abu Umar captured. Most of the known figures of the movement were also arrested and jailed. But, ironically, the consensus on Jihad and the decision to begin an offensive was reached while some of the ring leaders were in custody in one of Nigeria’s major prisons (Ribadu, 2015).
Because many of the arrowheads were influential clerics in their own rights, recruitment was initially through persuasive preaching and sermons, as well as one-on-one brainwashing encounters. Some of the leaders would go on itinerant preaching tours to towns and villages, recruiting largely frustrated young men already disenchanted about life. At the initial stage, the group survived on contributions from members, some of whom were traders or engaged in menial jobs.
In fact, many of them sold off their assets to contribute money towards keeping the
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movement alive. However, when the violent campaign commenced, and to maintain a growing number of recruits, the group took to kidnapping for ransom, bank raids and armed robbery. The money was also used in inducing recruits and settling families of deceased members (Ribadu, 2015).
Of course, the level of illiteracy and endemic poverty among the populace of Northern Nigeria provided a fertile ground for Boko Haram to quickly expand. This, as we shall come to see, also played a role in fuelling the confusion and conspiracy theories that have come with the insurgency (Ribadu, 2015).
Some of the early fatalities of Boko Haram operations were some of their own teachers in the past, who voiced disagreement with the weird theology of the terrorist group. Members deliberately used terror to intimidate all other preachers and dissenting voices. With this tool of terror, opposition to their ideological position from a theological standpoint became difficult as scholars became afraid of the fate that befell some of their colleagues. On the other hand, the group was consolidating its own ideological incursion through the production and distribution of sermons and propaganda materials in print and electronic forms. It was also, at the same time, reaching out to similar groups within Africa and the Middle East, including al-Shabab. This culminated in the allegiance paid to ISIS, which was coordinated through the effort of one Abu Basir al-Barnawi, a Boko Haram member from Nigeria (Ribadu, 2015).
2.5 Boko Haram Terrorists and Their Ideology in Nigeria
‘Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad’, better known by its Hausa name
‘Boko Haram’, is a Jihadist terrorist organization based in the northeast of Nigeria.
It is an Islamist movement which strongly opposes man-made laws. Founded by
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Mohammed Yusuf in 2001, the organization is a Muslim sect that seeks to abolish the secular system of government and establish Sharia Law in the country.
The movement, whose name in the Hausa language, Boko Haram, translates as "Western education is sacrilege" or "a sin" is divided into three factions, and in 2011, was responsible for more than 1000 killings in Nigeria (Eme et al, 2012:47).
Though the group first became known internationally following sectarian violence in Nigeria in 2009, it does not have a clear structure or evident chain of command. Moreover, it is still a matter of debate whether Boko Haram has links to terror outfits outside Nigeria and its fighters have frequently clashed with Nigeria's central government (Brock, 2012).
The group has adopted its official name to be People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, which is the English translation of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad(Cook,2011).
Boko Haram is an indigenous Salafist group which only turned itself into a Salafist Jihadist group in 2009. It propagates that not only interaction with the Western World is forbidden, but it is also against the Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria. The group publicly extols its ideology, despite the fact that its founder and former leader Muhammad Yusuf was himself a highly educated man who lived a lavish life and drove a Mercedes Benz (Bartolotta, 2011).
The group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2001 in the city of Maiduguri, with the aim of establishing a Shari'a government in Borno state under former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff. He established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school, where many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children.
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The centre had ulterior political goals and soon it was also working as a recruiting ground for future Jihadists to fight the state. The group includes members who came from neighbouring Chad and Niger and spoke only Arabic. In 2004, the complex was relocated to Yusuf's home state of Yobe, in the village Kanamma near the Niger Republic border.
Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss told IRIN News that Yusuf had successfully attracted followers from unemployed youths "by speaking out against police and political corruption (Farouk, 2012:2)". Abdulkarim Mohammed, a researcher on Boko Haram, added that violent uprisings in Nigeria were ultimately due to "the fallout from frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment” (Cook, 2011:3).
The members of the Boko Haram group do not interact with the local Muslim population and have carried out assassinations in the past on anyone who criticizes it, including Muslim clerics.
In a 2009 BBC interview, Muhammad Yusuf, then leader of the group, rejected scientific explanation for natural phenomena, such as the sun evaporating water being the cause of rain, Darwinian evolution, and the Earth being a sphere if it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah. Before his death, Yusuf reiterated the group's objective of changing the current education system and rejecting democracy.
In the wake of the 2009 crackdown on its members and its subsequent reemergence, the growing frequency and geographical range of attacks attributed to Boko Haram have led some political and religious leaders in the north to the conclusion that the group has now expanded beyond its original religious
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composition to include not only Islamic militants, but criminal elements and disgruntled politicians as well.
The group conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. That changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group's activities, following reports that its members were arming themselves; prior to that, the government reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization, including that of a military officer.
When the government came into action, several members of the group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated 700 people. During the fighting with the security forces, Boko Haram fighters reportedly "used fuel-laden motorcycles" and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station. The group's founder and then leader Mohammed Yusuf was also killed during this time while still in police custody.
After Yusuf's killing, a new leader emerged whose identity was not known at the time.
After the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January 2010. It resulted in the killing of four people. Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity.
In January 2012, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy of Yusuf (founder and pioneer leader of Boko Haram) appeared in a video posted on YouTube. According to Reuters, Shekau took control of the group after Yusuf's death in 2009.
Authorities had previously believed that Shekau died during the violence in 2009. By mid-April 2012, the group was responsible for over 1000 deaths.
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According to the Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima “Boko Haram has become a franchise that anyone can buy into. It is something like a Bermuda Triangle,”
(Baiyewu, 2012:9).
However, Dr Mu’azu Babangida Aliyu the then Niger State governor (2007-2015) has criticized the group saying “Islam is known to be a religion of peace and does not condone violence and crime in any form and Boko Haram does not represent Islam”.
The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar III, the spiritual leader of Nigerian Muslims, has called the sect "anti-Islamic" and, as reported by the website AllAfrica.com, "an embarrassment to Islam”. The Coalition of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria (CMCN) has called on the Boko Haram to disarm and embrace peace. Also, The Islamic Circle of North America, the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, The Muslim Council of Britain, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Council on American Islamic Relations have all condemned the group (Spencer, 2015).
2.6 Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria
Boko Haram has been a militant Islamic fundamentalist sect in Nigeria since 2001 (Onwuamaeze, 2011). In 2004, the sect relocated its base to Kanamma, which its members called Afghanistan in Yobe state (Osumah, 2013).
Notably, the group does not have links with the Taliban militants in Afghanistan.
The sect has now spread dangerously to the whole North. The Sharia conflict under the Obasanjo administration was said to have contributed immensely to its spread to the entire North (Osumah, 2013).
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More than three quarters of terrorist attacks in Nigeria during 2014 have occurred in the north-east, leading many investors from the south—where the vital oil industry is based—to believe that they are relatively immune to Islamist violence.
More than three quarters of terrorist attacks in Nigeria during 2014 have occurred in the north-east, leading many investors from the south—where the vital oil industry is based—to believe that they are relatively immune to Islamist violence.